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ABSTRACT
Fingerprinting the Smart Home: Detection of Smart Assistants Based on Network
Activity
Arshan Hashemi
As the concept of the Smart Home is being embraced globally, IoT devices such as the
Amazon Echo, Google Home, and Nest Thermostat are becoming a part of more and
more households. In the data-driven world we live in today, internet service providers
(ISPs) and companies are collecting large amounts of data and using it to learn about
their customers. As a result, it is becoming increasingly important to understand
what information ISPs are capable of collecting. IoT devices in particular exhibit
distinct behavior patterns and specific functionality which make them especially likely
to reveal sensitive information. Collection of this data provides valuable information
and can have some serious privacy implications.
In this work I present an approach to fingerprinting IoT devices behind private
networks while only examining last-mile internet traffic . Not only does this attack
only rely on traffic that would be available to an ISP, it does not require changes to
existing infrastructure. Further, it does not rely on packet contents, and therefore
works despite encryption.
Using a database of 64 million packets logged over 15 weeks I was able to train
machine learning models to classify the Amazon Echo Dot, Amazon Echo Show, Eufy
Genie, and Google Home consistently. This approach combines unsupervised and
supervised learning and achieves a precision of 99.95%, equating to one false positive
per 2,000 predictions. Finally, I discuss the implication of identifying devices within a
home.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of the Smart Home, questions have arisen regarding the privacy
and security implication of IoT devices within homes. In 2018, household penetration
of Smart Home devices in the United States is 32% and is expected to hit 53.1% by
2022 [6]. Similarly, it is predicted that by 2020, Virtual Personal Assistant (VPA)
enabled wireless speakers will be adopted by 3.3% of global households, accounting
for a $2.1 billion market. The increasing adoption of such devices coupled with the
questionable data-collection practices of vendors and service providers exacerbates
these concerns.
Recent events such as the leak of two million recordings between parents and
children by an internet-connected teddy bear company, CloudPets, [7] shed light
on the intimate nature of information that can be captured by devices within a
home. Furthermore, controversial data collection practices by large companies, such
as Facebook [8], have been subject to scrutiny leading to unease amongst the wide
range of stakeholders in IoT privacy. More so than ever, consumers are seeking strong
guarantees that their data is not being used in unexpected and unintended ways.
As a result, vendors and service providers have a large stake in preserving the trust
of consumers. Additionally, governments have a responsibility to pass legislation to
protect the rights of individuals, and consequently need to understand the gravity of
the situation. Currently under debate is the issue of what information companies have
a right to collect as well as the which practices people can reasonably expect to be
informed of. It has never been more important to examine the information ISPs have
access to and understand the role IoT devices can play in revealing it.
Smart Homes and IoT devices are changing not only the level of internet connec-
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tivity with which we operate, but also the nature of the interactions we have with the
internet. More and more, IoT devices are focusing on physical interactions, leveraging
microphones, cameras, sensors, and thermostats to learn about their environment
[9, 10]. While the privacy implications of such data collection is currently under debate,
the value of its collection is apparent and will only become increasingly important as
both the adoption and scope of internet-connected devices grow.
At best, current devices use secure encryption techniques to conceal actual packet
contents. Confidence in the sufficiency of encryption is so high that in 2017 the FCC
removed data collection restrictions claiming, “privacy risk is minimal, encryption
is pervasive” [11]. However, this is a false premise. It has been shown that even
encrypted packets can reveal sensitive information both about what devices a person
has in their home and what behaviors they are engaging in [11, 10, 12, 13]. Clearly, this
violates the privacy of individuals, but more concerning is the fact that an upstream
observer such as an ISP can gather information at scale with no changes to existing
infrastructure [12].
By collecting encrypted traffic observers can learn intimate details about individuals.
For example, traffic from a medical device can reveal health conditions, while traffic
from smart assistants and home automation devices can reveal at what times someone
is home or awake [13, 11]. When collected by ISPs this information can be used to
generate analytics that can be very valuable to businesses and be used to discriminate
against particular types of traffic.
It has been shown that attacks such as activity inference and behavioral profiling
are not difficult to perform if it is known in advance which devices are communicating.
Therefore, fingerprinting IoT devices is instrumental both in enabling malicious attacks
and generating valuable analytics [12].
In this work I examine the behavior of Smart Assistants, namely the Amazon
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Echo, Google Home, and Eufy Genie and propose an effective approach to identifying
IoT devices within NATed (Network Address Translation) or private networks. This
information is extracted solely from packet metadata of upstream network traffic in
the form of connection logs, similar to Netflows, which are then used to train machine
learning models to detect Smart Assistant traffic.
I address the following questions:
1. Can classifiers be trained to identify connections made by IoT devices given
only the features that an upstream observer would have access to when sniffing
packets coming from a NATed gateway router.
2. Are these methods feasible and accurate enough to have significant implications
on privacy?
3. Are these privacy concerns grave enough to warrant implementation of defenses
and regulation?
While previous work has achieved success at similar classification, it has been
mostly directed towards proving the feasibility of such an attack. The datasets are
small, many features of network traffic such as TCP flags are ignored, and model
precision is far too low to be deployable at scale. In addition to training models for
classification, a large portion of this work focuses on constructing an optimal feature
set and addressing concerns regarding the scalability of such a system. Further, I
utilize unsupervised machine learning to design a method of filtering traffic which
reduces the false discovery rate of devices.
3
Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 IoT Security and Privacy
A discussion has begun regarding the suitability of current Internet regulation gover-
nance [9, 14, 15]. In [9], Cerf et. al formalizes the concept of digital safety and address
the challenges facing Internet Governance. Cerf et. al argue that the responsibility
for addressing these issues is shared among all stakeholders in its security. These
stakeholders range from companies in the private sector who rely on the trust of
customers, the consumers whose privacy is at risk, and governmental entities who
hold the responsibility for protecting their citizens.
Network monitors [16] and privacy mediators [17] which enforce local privacy
policies and monitor for default passwords, unencrypted traffic, abnormal behavior,
and side-channel privacy leaks have been proposed in an attempt to reduce the
vulnerability. A separate effort is being conducted to examine current devices and
design methodologies to reduce some of the vulnerability [18]
2.2 Privacy Policies and Practices of Intelligent Virtual Assistants
Unsurprisingly, IVAs such as the Amazon Echo and Google Home have come under
scrutiny for their security and privacy practices. In [19],” Jackson et al. argue that
security and privacy concern for the Amazon Echo revolve around mutual trust rooted
in accuracy, fairness, and privacy.
Commonly, companies address these issues in their privacy notices and agreements.
However, agreement to these policies is often given automatically, through use of the
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device (Amazon Echo devices). This is problematic as policies often change over time
leaving the responsibility to track changes in the hands of the user [18].
Of pertinence to this paper are policies for data sharing with external parties
due to their business models and services. As the functionality and variety of IoT
applications increase, this data will become an asset that can be sold [18]. To maintain
privacy, it is essential that data is either stored locally or kept private if it is stored
in the cloud. If data is used to train models, is it done for the purpose of improving
functionality or user experience? And is this performed in a sufficiently anonymised
way?
2.3 Traffic Analysis and Device Fingerprinting
Attacks based on traffic analysis and device fingerprinting has been the subject of much
previous research. In [20], Kohno et al. describe the various classes of fingerprinting
techniques: active, passive, and semi-passive. To apply active fingerprinting, an
attacker must be able to initiate connections to the device being fingerprinted, whereas
in a passive attack all that is required is the ability to observe traffic. In a semi-passive
attack, the attacker has the ability to interact with the device being fingerprinted
after the connection has been initiated. Next, Kohno et al. propose passive and
semi-passive fingerprinting techniques which rely on TCP headers to calculate clock
skew, and determine if two devices on the internet are actually the same physical
device.
In [21], Felten et. al, compromise the privacy of users’ Web-browsing history by
measuring the time it takes for certain web pages to load. The time it takes to revisit
recently accessed websites is significantly lower due to use of web caching mechanisms
by both browsers and DNS. Felten et. al show that an attacker can distinguish cache
hits from misses with 96.7% accuracy.
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2.4 Fingerprinting NATed Hosts and Netflows
One of the intricacies of device identification is that many individual devices are
often represented by a single NAT box such as a router. From the perspective of
an upstream observer, NATed devices appear to be coming from a single endpoint
making it difficult to know the number of distinct hosts. In [22], Bellovin proposes a
method of counting the number of hosts behind small NAT boxes based on IP header
information. Bellovin shows that fields in the IP header often reveals which packets
originate from the same underlying device.
However, at scale network monitoring is often performed not at the packet level
but at the Netflow level. Netflow records are concise representations of network
traffic and are used to collect IP/TCP traffic statistics for data analysis [23]. From
each packet a key comprised of the IP source and destination addresses, source and
destination ports, and protocol is extracted. Additional statistics relating to the
cumulative number of exchanged packets, bytes, timestamps, and TCP flags, and
ToS are calculated. Each set of records is grouped by key into flows, which can then
be further grouped bi-directionally by taking the union of the both one-way flows
between two communicating hosts. However, this compactness comes at a cost, with
information such as payload of the packet lost, it becomes more complicated to track
hosts.
In [23] Verde et. al address the more difficult problem of fingerprinting users
behind NAT from NetFlow Records alone. Verde et. al present a framework to identify
NATed users within a network. The framework operates in two stages:
Stage 1:
1. Takes as input NetFlow raw records of the target user
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2. Trains a set of Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) to capture the time component
of user activities
3. Selects the best performing HMM
Stage 2:
1. Uses selected HMM to classify unknown traffic
2. Aggregates results into a new dataset that describes time intervals
3. Applies Random Forest for final classification
This strategy was able to achieve greater than 90% precision and recall in scenarios
where there were up to 1,000 users simultaneously connected behind 2 NATed IP
addresses. These results are significant given the scale of the experiment and complex
behavioral patterns of users. It follows that similar methods can be used to identify
devices.
2.5 Fingerprinting IoT Devices
Fingerprinting of IoT devices behind a NATed home networks is a topic that had not
previously been explored deeply. Still, I consider a small but influential set of papers
foundational to my work.
In the paper [13], Srinivasan et. al present the Fingerprint and Timing-based
Snooping (FATS) attack which shows that private in-home activities can be observed
by eavesdropping on wireless transmissions of sensors in a home, even in the presence
of encryption. The attack relies on wireless fingerprinting based on the physical
characteristics of RF transmissions to identify devices. Using similar characteristics,
identified devices can then be grouped into spatial clusters representing rooms in a
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home, and these then clusters can be classified as a kitchen, bathroom, bedroom,
etc. This information can then be combined to determine what activities are being
performed in a home at a given time. Using this method, Srinivasan et al. were able
to achieve 80-95% accuracy on activity recognition. However, because this attack
relies on wireless transmissions it is limited to a LAN and cannot be performed by an
upstream observer.
Taking a different approach, Apthorpe et al. propose an attack which is effective
while only relying on traffic available to a passive upstream observer [12]. This attack
examines DNS queries and traffic rates to fingerprint common IoT devices using a
3-nearest neighbor classifier. Apthorpe et al. find that surprisingly simple traffic
features can distinguish smart home appliances with greater than 95% accuracy, but
suggests that more complex features may lead to improved accuracy. Further, they
explore the possibility of activity inference and determine that given the limited
purpose of IoT devices, once a device has been identified, user activity can be inferred
easily through traffic rates.
A third paper, [10] demonstrates that home automation devices such as a Nest
Thermostat are susceptible to similar fingerprinting techniques. Bro, a network analysis
framework, was used to generate logs from connections captured on a local network.
Device behavior was profiled, and correlation analysis was used to find associations
between connections made and observed behavior. Notably, Nest Thermostats reflect
distinct, identifiable patterns in network communications depending on which mode
the device was in. The mode in use directly indicated with 67% to 88% accuracy
whether somebody was home or if the house was empty. However, this approach
was limited by its requirement that connections be exactly the same size in order to
indicate the same behavior.
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Chapter 3
BACKGROUND
3.1 IoT and the Smart Home
The Internet of Things was a term coined to describe the ever-growing number of
internet connected devices. These devices range from sensors such as video cameras
and wearable devices to actuators which allow for control and management of home
appliances remotely. A final class of IoT devices known as Smart Objects combine the
functionality of both actuators and sensors [1].
The typical architecture of IoT Systems includes the following [18]:
• Internet of things device: The component which interacts with the environment,
collecting information and performing some action.
• Data transport: this component represents the communication network between
the IoT device and cloud services.
• Cloud Service: Collect and store data sent from IoT devices. Provides IoT
devices services such as analytics and feedback. Often the key aspects of a
device’s functionality rely on constant communication with a cloud service.
3.2 IVA
A common type of IoT device is the Intelligent Virtual Assistant (IVA). An IVA is
defined as a device running an agent powered by artificial intelligence whose purpose
is to process voice data, perform analysis, and respond to user requests [24]. In this
9
Figure 3.1: Typical IoT system[1]
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paper I focus on standalone IVAs that reside on dedicated devices, and rely entirely
on cloud services for their intelligence.
3.3 Machine Learning
Machine learning is a subfield of artificial intelligence focused on designing algorithms
that can learn from data without relying on rules-based programming [25]. Machine
learning algorithms make predictions using statistical methods to estimate complex
functions [26]. This is allows them to learn patterns in data that would be difficult or
impossible to learn otherwise.
Machine learning is referred to as supervised when an outcome variable is present
to guide the learning process. This allows the model to learn what underlying features
are usually associated with a certain outcome. Unsupervised learning occurs when only
the features are observed and there is no measurement of the outcome [27]. Lacking
outcomes, an unsupervised algorithm is forced to make predictions by grouping similar
observations. The two types of machine learning are commonly distinguished by the
presence of labels in the dataset.
In this work, I focus on both unsupervised and supervised techniques to achieve
optimal classification. While there is a wide variety of machine learning algorithms, I
focus only on those which best suited my needs.
3.4 Decision Trees
It is possible to represent acquired knowledge in the form of a decision tree. The tree
attempts to classify objects described in terms of attributes based on rules derived
from previous examples. Each object belongs to one of a set of mutually exclusive
classes. A decision tree is constructed from these examples beginning with the root of
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Figure 3.2: Decision Tree[2]
the tree and proceeding down to its leaves which represent classes. All other nodes
represent attribute based tests with a branch for each possible outcome. To classify
an object we traverse the tree, starting at the root, evaluate the test, and follow the
appropriate branch to the next node. This is repeated until a leaf is encountered, at
which point the object is classified.
The goal is to construct a decision tree based on rules extracted from a training
set, and attempt to use it to classify other unseen objects as well. Therefore, a simpler
decision tree is favorable as it is more likely to represent generalized rules. The
question that follows is how to form a reasonably simple decision tree without having
to examine every possible tree. At the core, this question depends on the choice of the
attribute-based test represented by nodes in the tree. If at the root of the tree there
is a particular attribute who’s test would result in splits of the dataset such that each
split contains objects of a single class then it can be said that this attribute is the
optimal choice. It is therefore possible to choose an attribute at each non-leaf node of
the tree that best splits the remaining objects.
The decision of best splitting attribute is made according to some heuristic function.
A common method is to choose the attribute that results in the greatest Information
Gain. Given an attribute A that splits the set S into subsets Si, the average entropy
of the subsets is computed and compared to the entropy of the original set S. Entropy
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is a measure of orderedness in the class distribution of S, and is defined in section 3.12
of this thesis.
However, Information Gain can be biased towards choosing attributes with a large
number of values which can lead to both overfitting and fragmentation (splitting into
too many small sets).
One alternative is to use the Gini Index which instead of entropy uses an impurity
measure
Where pi is the proportion of objects with class i. The average Gini index can then be
defined as
Which is then used to calculate the Gini Gain
3.5 Random Forests
A Random Forest is a classifier consisting of a collection of tree-structured classifiers
where each tree casts a unit vote for its prediction, and the most popular class is
chosen [3]. Each tree (typically a decision tree) is built from a sample drawn with
replacement from the training set. Additionally, when constructing the tree, the best
splitting attribute is selected not from the full feature set but from a random subset
of features.
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Figure 3.3: Random Forest[3]
Figure 3.4: Typical MLP configuration[4]
This induces randomness in the collection of trees which, due to averaging, leads to
lower variance and greater robustness in the model. This also leads to faster training
and greater scalability as for each tree both the training and feature set are reduced
to smaller sub-samples of the original dataset.
It is important to note that in contrast to the original publication, some imple-
mentations of Random Forests combines classifiers by averaging their probabilistic
prediction, instead of letting each classifier vote for a single class. This is true for
both the scikit-learn and Matlab implementations [28, 29].
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3.6 Neural Networks
A common class of artificial neural networks is the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP). An
MLP is composed of interconnected nodes, or neurons, contained in an input layer,
one or more hidden layers, and an output layer. In a feedforward MLP, each neuron
in a layer receives a set of inputs from the previous layer, calculates the sum, and
outputs a value referred to as the activation to each of the neurons in the next layer.
If enough inputs to a particular neuron activate, a threshold is surpassed and the
neuron, itself, activates.
This activation threshold is modeled by the bias, a number that the sum of the
inputs has to surpass in order to activate the neuron. However, to model complex
decision making, the inputs to a neuron need to be able to take on different weights.
Whether or not a neuron activates can now be defined as a function of z :
A sum of the weighted input, wx, to a neuron added to a negative bias, b, for that
neuron. If z is greater than zero, the threshold is exceeded and the neuron activates
outputting a number close to one, but if z is less than zero, the neuron does not
activate and outputs a number close to zero. This is mathematically modeled by an
activation function such as the sigmoid function
This function is commonly used and offers a smooth curve which allows the network
to learn effectively through a technique called gradient descent.
Gradient descent is an iterative approach to minimizing the error of the network
by taking small steps in the direction of decreased error until a local optima is reached.
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Figure 3.5: Sigmoid Activation Function
A cost function must be defined to quantify the error in terms of the predicted and
expected output of the network. This is accomplished by the cross-entropy cost
function.
Where y is defined as the expected output, a is the activation, a = (z), and n is
the number of training inputs. This error function is only dependent on one variable,
a which is a function of the weights and biases of the neurons in the network. By
taking the gradient of the error function with respect to the weights and biases, we
can determine the direction in which the error increases the most. By taking a step in
the opposite direction, we can decrease the error the most. Step by step the network
slowly adjusts its weights and biases in order to achieve the minimum possible error.
The size of each step taken is called the learning rate and defines how much the
network tweaks its weights and biases on each iteration. A large learning rate leads to
a network that cannot fine tune its weights and biases by small enough amounts to
reach true minimum error. A small learning rate results in a network that learns too
slowly to be useful.
Actual implementations of gradient descent often use an algorithm called back-
propagation. Backpropagation feeds input data through the network and computes
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the cost of the model with the current weights. The error in the output of the network
is determined in terms of the weights and biases of the output layer. This step is
repeated putting those weights and biases in terms of the weights and biases of the
previous layer. This process continues propagating backwards through the layers of the
network. By doing this, the algorithm can calculate the gradient of the error function
with respect to the weights and biases of each individual neuron in the network, and
as a result knows how to tweak them in order to decrease the total error.
3.7 K-means clustering
The K-Means algorithm is a versatile and scalable clustering technique that can be
applied to many different applications. It works by assigning points to k clusters and
then attempting to minimize the distance between the points within a cluster and that
cluster’s centroid which is calculated as the mean value of all the samples assigned
to it. The algorithm iteratively reassigns clusters and recalculates centroids until it
converges on a particular clustering.
Given an integer k and a set of n data points Xd. This occurs through the following
steps [30]:
1. Arbitrarily choose an initial k centers C= {c1,c2... ,ck}.
2. For each i ∈ {1,... ,k}, set the cluster ci to be the set of points in X that are
closer to ci than they are to cj for all j 6=i.
3. For each i ∈ {1,... ,k}, set ci to be the center of mass of all points in Ci:
4. Repeat Steps 2 and 4 until C no longer changes.
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The performance of K-means is highly dependant on the initial choice of centroids
as well as the distance metric used. For centroid initialization I chose to use the
k-means++ which selects initial cluster centers to be distant from each other, leading
to provably better results than random initializations [31]. For the distance metric, I
chose the inertia, sum of squared distances of samples within a cluster to their nearest
neighbor:
3.8 Mini-Batch K-Means
Mini-Batch K-Means uses mini-batches to reduce the computation time and memory
requirements of the K-means algorithm. Mini-batches are subsets of the input data,
randomly sampled in each training iteration. Results are slightly worse than traditional
K-means, but the lower quality is outweighed by improvements in computation time
[32].
3.9 Model Validation
For a given dataset it is necessary to define a procedure to evaluate predictive models.
It would be incorrect to test the performance of a model on the same data that it
was trained on. A common evaluation strategy is the holdout method which involves
partitioning the dataset into a training set and a testing or set. However, this method
is highly unpredictable as the evaluation is dependant on which points are selected to
be in the training and testing sets.
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Figure 3.6: Confusion Matrix[5]
3.9.1 K-fold Cross Validation
To reduce the evaluation’s dependence on the way data is partitioned, K-fold cross-
validation is implemented. In K-fold cross-validation, the dataset is divided into k
subsets and the holdout method is repeated k times. Each of the k subsets is selected
once as the testing set while the remaining k-1 subsets are used as the training set.
Performance is evaluated as the average across all k trials. This method also reduces
the effect of overfitting which occurs when the model becomes so closely fit to a limited
set of data points that it begins to model noise and idiosyncrasies which may not be
representative of the entire dataset.
3.10 Classifier Performance Metrics
For binary classification it is often useful to represent performance in the form of a
confusion matrix. 3.6 shows the layout of a typical confusion matrix.
True Positives (TP) are defined as the number of correct positive predictions,
True Negatives (TN) are defined as the number of correct negative predictions, False
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Positives (FP) are defined as the number of incorrect positive predictions, and False
Negatives (FN) are defined as the number of incorrect negative predictions. It is then
possible to define the following performance metrics in terms of the labels provided by
the confusion matrix.
3.10.1 Accuracy
Accuracy is the percentage of correctly classified samples. Given a testing set of size
N it is defined as
To effectively measure classifier performance, accuracy alone is often insufficient as it
is an incomplete measure of performance. In cases where the overwhelming majority
of the samples belong to a single class, classifiers can achieve high accuracy by simply
predicting the majority class. Further, it does not differentiate between the type of
error being made. To compensate for this deficiency several more informative metrics
are often measured.
3.10.2 Precision
Precision can be thought of as a measure of classifier exactness and is defined as the
proportion of positively predicted samples that were positively labeled.
3.10.3 Recall
Recall can be thought of as measure of classifier completeness and is the proportion of
positively labeled samples that were positively predicted.
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3.10.4 F1 Score
The F1 Score is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall, therefore, taking both
False Negatives and False Positives into account. It is defined as
3.10.5 False Positive Rate
The False Positive Rate (FPR) is the proportion of negative samples that were
predicted positively and is defined as
3.10.6 False Discovery Rate
The False Discovery Rate (FDR) is the proportion of all positively predicted samples
who are actually negative samples and is defined as
3.10.7 One-vs.-Rest Transformation
To utilize the metrics defined above in the case of multiclass classification, a transfor-
mation is necessary to reduce the problem to multiple binary classification problems.
A simple solution is the one-vs.-rest approach which, for each class, characterizes all
samples of that class as positive samples and all other samples as negative.
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3.11 Clustering Performance
Measuring performance of unsupervised learners is typically more complicated than
that of classifiers. In the case where the class labels are not known it is necessary to
evaluate the grouping of samples by some metric of similarity.
One common method is to measure the variation within a cluster. This can be
done by calculating the Sum of Squared Errors (SSE) defined as
Where n is the number of samples in a cluster, xi is the value of the ith sample,
and x is the mean of all samples. In K Means clusters the SSE is equivalent the total
sum of squared Euclidean distances.
Euclidean distance does not factor in that attributes of a given sample may be on
different scales. One solution is to alternatively find the coefficient of variance within
the cluster. Given a dataset of size n with individual samples x the mean, x¯, and
standard deviation, σ, are
The coefficient of variation is
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3.12 Information Entropy
In the case where class labels are known, it is possible to evaluate performance by
comparing the clustering to the ground truth grouping. In a simple case the number
of clusters is equal to the number of classes. However, in more complex scenarios
samples belonging to each class can exhibit many distinct patterns of behavior. While
these patterns will cluster together, it is unreasonable to expect these patterns to
further cluster by class label. One solution is to allow for a number of clusters larger
than the number of classes, providing finer granularity.
Information Entropy can be leveraged to define a metric for how valuable a
clustering is with respect to the ground truth labels. If a cluster had to be associated
with a class label, a simple solution would be to examine all the samples in the cluster
and assign the most common class label to that cluster. Entropy can then be described
as a measure of the uncertainty with which this cluster labeling occurs. Consider a
dataset D = {D1... ,Dn} comprised of a list of n data instances. Suppose the class
label attribute, C, has k distinct values defining k distinct classes, {c1... ,ck}. Let Di
be the set of data instances in D with the class label of ci. Then we can define the
probability of observing a particular class as,
The Shannon entropy of the dataset D with respect to textitC is defined as follows
[33, 34]:
If a cluster is comprised of samples belonging to the same ground truth class then
that cluster can be considered pure and has minimum entropy of 0. If a cluster is
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perfectly split between classes then it has maximum entropy (the exact value of which
varies by the number of classes).
3.13 Tools
My research was dependant on a selection of tools for classification, clustering, traffic
analysis, and data preprocessing.
3.13.1 Matlab
Matlab is a platform for computational mathematics. It combines a matrix-based
programming language with a desktop environment that caters to many scientific and
engineering applications[mathworks ref]. Matlab offers built-in toolboxes for Deep
Learning and Machine Learning that provide useful performance metrics and support
for parameter tuning. I utilized the Neural Network Toolbox to train and test MLP
classifiers and the Classification Learner for Decision Trees and Random Forests.
3.13.2 Scikit-Learn
Scikit-learn is a machine learning library for the Python programming language. It
provides tools for data mining and data analysis such as clustering, classification,
preprocessing, and others. I found the implementation of the K-Means and Mini-Batch
K-Means algorithms particularly useful for clustering analysis. Additionally, I utilized
Scikit-learn for standardization, normalization, and other data preprocessing tasks.
3.13.3 Bro
Bro is an open source network analysis framework. It can be used as an intrusion
detection system but I was primarily interested in its capabilities as a traffic analysis
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tool. In particular Bro can generate comprehensive logs that describe network activity,
and I specifically examined the TCP/UDP/ICMP, DNS, HTTP, and FTP activity
logs.
3.13.4 Wireshark
Wireshark is a widely used network protocol analyzer. It offers a GUI through
which network data can be browsed. This provided me with the ability to conduct
preliminary analysis as well as the option to delve into irregular behavior that I
observed. Wireshark also offers functionality to read and write many different capture
formats, allowing me to convert packet captures from hexdump to pcap.
3.13.5 Intel NUC
The Intel NUC which stands for Next Unit of Computing, is a small personal computer
designed by Intel. It offers a lightweight and customizable board which can accept
various operating systems, storage, and memory.
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Chapter 4
THE DATASET
To answer the questions posed by this work it was imperative that I have access to
a dataset consisting of a large amount of quality IoT data generated through legal
methods. Fortunately, an effort to generate such a dataset was taking place at the
time of my research, and I was able to work in conjunction with several other students
to meet this need which could be divided into three key components:
• Establishment of a threat model
• Construction of a testbed for data generation
• Implementation of a pipeline for data processing
4.1 Threat Model
In the attack presented in this work the adversary is defined as a passive network
observer with access to upstream network traffic and with the goal of inferring what
devices exist behind a private network. The attacker does not have access to LAN
traffic. Therefore, the attack must be possible even if hosts are NATed behind a
gateway router. This is meant to emulate the information available to an ISP or
similar entity.
Further, the attacker is not able to manipulate traffic or actively engage with the
devices, and as a result, is forced to only examine traffic generated by these devices
when they are idle or not directly being interacted with.
Second, many devices communicate securely through TLS/SSL, so we assume that
packet contents are encrypted and therefore cannot be used. By relying solely on
26
packet metadata we can establish an attack which is still successful despite industry
best practices for ensuring security.
Data collection can occur at both the individual packet level (PCAP) and flow
level (IPFIX, Netflow, connection logs). Generation and collection of flow level data
is already supported by most routers in large networks [12] meaning that this attack
will require minimal changes to existing infrastructure. Using standard collection
procedures, records can be aggregated, stored in a database, and used to train machine
learning algorithms.
4.2 IoT Testbed
I retrieved captures of Smart Assistant network traffic taken from a database con-
structed by a team of Cal Poly students [Ryan’s Paper]. The database was constructed
in a laboratory environment where an Intel NUC, configured as a wireless access point,
logged all network traffic sent from 15 IoT devices over a period of 15 weeks.
The Intel NUC received an internet connection through its Ethernet port and
shared its connection with other devices as an 802.11n access point. A python script
running on the access point listens on a socket opened on the wireless interface.
Incoming and outgoing packets are captured, and the packet metadata and hexdump
are stored in an Amazon RDS MySQL database.
4.3 Implementation of a pipeline for data processing
The packet logging table of the database contains about 64 million packets and 71
gigabytes worth of data. Due to the large table size and memory constraints it was not
feasible to make queries over large periods of time. Initial queries for just a few day’s
worth of data from 4 devices would time out after several hours. To speed up packet
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retrieval I utilized a multithreaded approach. Running on the 32 core computers in the
Cal Poly Massively Parallel Accelerated Computing (MPAC) Laboratory, I launched
28 worker threads which each simultaneously queried the database for 2 hour chunks
of captures and merged the results to a single file. This reduced the time to query for
all relevant data to 1 hour. I collected 20 million packets sent by the Amazon Echo
Dot, Amazon Echo Show, Eufy Genie, and Google Home.
Because the packets were sniffed on the LAN, the capture included both upstream
and internal LAN traffic. Devices would often attempt to discover and communicate
with other devices on the same network. For example, applications that were enabled
on multiple devices, such as Spotify, would attempt to synchronize on a tablet, smart
TV, and Amazon Echo. Although devices exhibited interesting interactions on the
LAN, to stay consistent with the Threat Model, I chose to remove all traffic that
originated and was destined for an address within the three private address blocks:
• 10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255
• 72.16.00 – 172.31.255.255
• 192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255
To extract features from the packet metadata I chose to convert the packet capture
to flow-level records (connection logs) using Bro’s network analysis tools. After
removing any LAN connections, the resulting log contained 800,000 connections which
were then converted to CSV format to simplify integration with Matlab. The features
shown in Table 4.1 were extracted.
4.3.1 Connection State
The connection state feature can take the values listed in Table 4.2
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orig h The originator’s IP address
orig p The originator’s port number.
resp h The responder’s IP address
resp p The responder’s port number
proto The transport layer protocol of the connection
service An identification of an application protocol being sent over the connection
duration How long the connection lasted
orig-bytes The number of payload bytes the originator sent
resp bytes The number of payload bytes the responder sent
conn state Information about the type of connection
missed bytes Number of bytes missed in content gaps, which is representative of packet loss
history State history of connections as a string of letters
orig pkts Number of packets that the originator sent.
orig ip bytes Number of IP level bytes that the originator sent
resp pkts Number of packets that the responder sent
resp ip bytes Number of IP level bytes that the responder sent
Table 4.1: Features extracted from each connection
S0 Connection attempt seen, no reply.
S1 Connection established, not terminated.
SF Normal establishment and termination
REJ Connection attempt rejected.
S2 Connection established and close attempt by originator seen (but no reply from responder).
S3 Connection established and close attempt by responder seen (but no reply from originator).
RSTO Connection established, originator aborted (sent a RST).
RSTR Responder sent a RST.
RSTOS0 Originator sent a SYN followed by a RST, we never saw a SYN-ACK from the responder.
RSTRH Responder sent a SYN ACK followed by a RST, we never saw a SYN from the (purported) originator.
SH Originator sent a SYN followed by a FIN, we never saw a SYN ACK from the responder (hence the connection was “half” open).
SHR Responder sent a SYN ACK followed by a FIN, we never saw a SYN from the originator.
OTH No SYN seen, just midstream traffic (a “partial connection” that was not later closed).
Table 4.2: Connection State
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s a SYN w/o the ACK bit set
h a SYN+ACK (“handshake”)
a a pure ACK
d packet with payload (“data”)
f packet with FIN bit set
r packet with RST bit set
c packet with a bad checksum
t packet with retransmitted payload
i inconsistent packet (e.g. FIN+RST bits set)
q multi-flag packet (SYN+FIN or SYN+RST bits set)
ˆ connection direction was flipped by Bro’s heuristic
Table 4.3: Connection History
4.3.2 History
History records the state history of connections as a string of letters. The meaning of
the letters is defined in Table 4.3:
If the event comes from the originator, the letter is in upper-case; if it comes from
the responder, it’s in lower-case. Multiple packets of the same type will only be noted
once.
4.4 CTU Dataset
To measure the performance of the classifiers in a realistic scenario it was also necessary
to introduce background traffic from which the Smart Assistants could be identified. It
is not a trivial task to create a dataset representative of real network traffic. A capture
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must take place on a large and real network, but rely solely on packet metadata in
order to protect user privacy.
The CTU-13 Dataset provides large samples of live network traffic obtained on
the Czech Technical University campus [35]. The dataset provides thirteen different
captures outputted in various formats including PCAP, NetFlows, and Bro connection
logs. The captures were taken on the CTU campus over periods ranging from a few
hours to a few days.
I included 3 additional captures: CTU-Normal-6, CTU-Normal-7, and CTU-
Normal-12. Each of these datasets include captures taken of a user working on a
computer for several hours. The computers involved were either desktops or notebooks
running Linux.
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Chapter 5
MACHINE LEARNING
5.1 Methodology
Training supervised learners to best classify devices was an iterative process that
involved experimentation and analysis. Preliminary results indicated that devices
engaged in patterns of behavior that were classifiable. However, to reach accept-
able levels of accuracy it was necessary to establish a methodology that maximized
performance of the classifiers. The methodology consisted of the following steps:
• Select the set of machine learning algorithms best suited for the problem
• Construct an optimal feature set
• Define specific performance goals
• Use pre-processing and unsupervised learning to optimize model performance
5.2 Selection of Machine Learning Algorithms
To select a supervised algorithm for classification I examined Neural Networks, Support
Vector Machines, and Random Forests. These algorithms are widely considered to
be the best performing machine learning algorithms, although their performance is
strongly dependant on the data and nature of the classification problem.
Neural networks are meant to remove the need for feature extraction and engineer-
ing, but given a situation where this task has already been performed, Random Forests
are better suited. Additionally, Random Forests work well with a mixture of numerical
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and categorical features while Neural Networks and Support Vector Machines require
categorical attributes to be encoded numerically.
I ultimately chose Random Forests as the primary classifier as both preliminary and
final results showed that Random Forests provided the best classification performance.
However, during informal experimentation I also relied on Decision Trees due to their
quick training time and similarity to Random Forests.
I additionally provide classification results for neural networks at various stages
in my results. Although they did not perform as well as Random Forests, I felt they
were important to include as a performance benchmark. It should be noted, though,
that neural networks are typically used with larger, more complex feature sets and
significantly more training data than this work provides.
In Appendix B I experimentally verify that Random Forests are the best performing
model for this problem.
5.3 Feature Selection
In this step each feature was individually evaluated by training models on a single
feature. High accuracy indicated that the feature was particularly useful for distin-
guishing devices. The differentiating features can be referred to as primary features
which combine to form the minimal feature set. The minimal feature set represents
smallest possible set of features that can be used to classify devices with reasonable
accuracy. In the event that network observers are limited by the number or variety of
features that can be extracted, the minimal feature set provides a baseline for device
classification.
The remaining features could be subdivided into two more categories. Comple-
mentary features which did not perform well individually but combined with other
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features to improve accuracy, and features that did not provide improved accuracy in
any situation. An intuitive example of the first case is the protocol feature. Due to the
limited number of protocols, this feature is not very descriptive, but when combined
with other features can help to define patterns in device behavior.
The process of feature selection documented in detail in Appendix C.
5.4 Defining Performance Goals
Classification of IVAs can be alternatively reframed as a problem of binary classification:
Given traffic of all types, can a particular device be identified? With this framing, it
now possible to identify the two types of error that can occur:
• Type 1 error (false positive): indicating that a device exists in a network when
it does not
• Type 2 error (false negative): failing to identify a device when it is present in a
network
Given the nature of the classification problem the two types of errors can vary in
significance. Therefore, it is important to contextually examine the consequences of
each type of error to determine which should be prioritized.
In the case of device classification it is clear that Type 1 errors carry a much higher
cost than Type 2 errors. A high number of false positives, leads to high uncertainty in
predictions, and a classifier that cannot be trusted is not acceptable in this situation.
Even a false positive rate of 1% becomes problematic when classification occurs at
scale. An ISP with thousands of customers will generate far too many false positives
to be able to confidently identify devices.
Conversely, false negatives are much less significant. There is a wide variety of
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behaviors that devices engage in, and it would be acceptable for most of them to be
ignored if it meant that a few could be identified with high confidence. Consequently,
I consider the reduction of false positives to be the most important problem which
this work seeks to solve.
5.5 Types of Device Behaviors
To identify the potential causes of false positives, it is necessary to understand the
behavior of devices. Intuitively, it can be said that devices will send some traffic that
is similar to other devices and some that is different. For example, similar traffic
can be comprised of DNS queries or short connections that are not indicative of any
particular behavior while more distinct behavior will likely occur over more complex
connections. It is important to note that in some cases short connections can still be
representative of unique behavior, but there exists a subset of these connections which
are not informative.
A false positive can occur as a result of two scenarios. First, a false positive may
be generated when the input is unable to be understood by the classifier, forcing it to
make an inaccurate prediction. This could be a result of insufficient model training or
noise in the input. In the second case, a particular type of connection is consistently
labeled as belonging to multiple devices. If the underlying behavior is performed
by multiple devices, the classifier will become confused. Returning to the previous
example, if all the devices sent DNS queries that resulted in identical connections,
classification of this behavior would be unpredictable. Therefore, the classifier should
not be attempting to predict the presence of a device based on a type of connection
are commonly made by multiple devices.
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5.6 Clustering
Clustering can be used to identify groupings of similar behavior. An effective clustering
algorithm should be able to form clusters such that each connection within a cluster
is an instance of a distinct behavior that devices engage in. For instance, it would be
reasonable to expect all pings, or ICMP Echo traffic, to cluster together regardless of
the device.
These groupings, or clusters, can then be examined to determine if they are at a
high risk of leading to false positives. Connections associated with high risk clusters
can then be ignored leading to a direct decrease in false positives observed.
Formally, it can be said that observed behavior can be separated into clusters that
are either homogeneous or heterogeneous. Clusters that are homogeneous describe
unique behavior and are well-suited for identifying devices. On the other hand, clusters
that are heterogeneous describe behavior that is engaged in by multiple devices and
will only lead to confusion. Therefore, the elimination of heterogeneous clusters is
synonymous with the elimination of groupings with a high risk of producing false
positives.
Cluster heterogeneity can be quantified by the Information Entropy (3.12) which in
this case is simply a measure of the uncertainty with which a cluster can be associated
with a particular device. By defining an entropy threshold to represent the highest
acceptable heterogeneity, clusters that are not easily associated with a particular
device can be filtered out. Setting the entropy threshold to zero would mean that
everything but pure clusters (clusters with one one type of device) would be removed
from the dataset.
To apply this strategy to my classifier I used the K-Means algorithm to identify
heterogeneous clusters and filter out their corresponding connections. The K-means
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algorithm was chosen due to its efficient run-time of O(n). Given the size of the
input dataset as well as the potentially high number of clusters, non-linear algorithms
such as Hierarchical Clustering would quickly become unmanageable. The runtime
and memory usage were only further improved through the use of the optimized
Mini-Batch variation of the K-Means algorithm. It is important to note that K-means
is known to struggle with high dimensionality and non-hyper-spherical cluster shape,
but given the low number of features, this was not an issue.
Another limitation of K-Means Clustering is that the ideal K value (the number of
clusters) is not known ahead of time. It is necessary to derive this value experimentally
by examining many values of K and measuring the effectiveness of the clustering.
To derive the value of K, clustering performance must be evaluated to determine
if the algorithm is providing groupings that are sufficiently distinct. First, the entropy
can be examined to determine the type of groupings that are being made. An effective
clustering algorithm will isolate specific behavior which can be either performed by a
single device, or common to multiple devices. Therefore, clusters will be either very
homogenous or very heterogeneous resulting in entropy values at both extremes, but
very few in the middle. It can then be said that high variance in the distribution of
cluster entropy is an indicator of effective clustering.
This method allowed me to narrow down my search to a smaller range of K values,
but an alternative method was needed to provide a more fine grained evaluation
of performance. Revisiting the notion that a cluster represents a behavior that is
repetitively engaged in, it would be reasonable to assume that a good clustering
algorithm would produce clusters that contain very similar connections. Similarity can
be quantitatively measured by the standard deviation of each feature of a connection.
However, since the features are on different scales, a standardized measure of variance,
the coefficient of variation, is needed to represent the total similarity. By calculating
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the average coefficient of variation across all attributes, or features, the similarity of a
cluster can be calculated. Further, this value can be averaged across all clusters to
determine the effectiveness of an instance of the K-Means algorithm.
5.7 Classifier Integration
To integrate this method into my classifier I train the K-Means model on the training
dataset to identify the heterogeneous clusters based on entropy. For each heterogeneous
cluster, the cluster number is recorded and connections within that cluster are dropped
from the dataset. The remaining connections are then used to train the classifier.
After training, the K-Means model can indicate which cluster a new input would
be placed into without having to recalculate every cluster. If an new connection
is assigned to a cluster that was previously determined to be heterogeneous, it is
not classified. As a result the classifier will not be given the opportunity to make a
prediction on a connection that has a high chance of producing a false positive.
Decreasing the entropy threshold decreases false positives and reduces the amount
of noise in the dataset. However, it is necessary to tolerate some level of heterogeneity
in order to prevent overfitting and increase model robustness. Further, low thresholds
can filter out the majority of a device’s data which can lead to a poorly trained model.
The entropy threshold is effectively a parameter that can be adjusted to give
preference to false positives over false negatives. A high entropy threshold will allow
for training on a larger and more diverse set of data increasing the completeness or
recall of the classifier. A low entropy threshold leads to a model which can predict
the presence of devices less often but with much greater precision. I experimentally
determine the entropy threshold which meets the performance needs in Section 6.4.
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5.8 Removing Noise from the Dataset
In addition to reducing the false positive rate, clustering was useful for removing
noise from the dataset. For the 15 weeks during which this dataset was generated
the devices were left almost entirely untouched with an event log kept to record any
interactions. However, there was ultimately some unlogged interactions with the
devices which were included in the dataset. I defined two heuristics to identify and
remove extraneous connections. A cluster should only be included if: It contains
greater than 105 connections as this represents a behavior that occurs at least daily
It contains greater than 15 connections and has a low coefficient of variation. This
heuristic is meant to account for behavior that is irregular but especially distinct such
as a weekly software update.
It is important to remember that a cluster must still meet the entropy threshold
to be included, but these heuristics prevent excessively small but homogenous clusters
from being included in the dataset.
5.9 Note about the Dataset
It is not entirely accurate to state that this dataset provides data from four distinct
IoT devices. At times the Amazon Echo Show and Amazon Echo Dot communicate
with each other in ways that two devices made by different manufacturers would not.
For example, the devices communicate such that only one device responds to a voice
command that both may have heard. The extent at which this collaboration occurs is
unknown, but judging by the respective distributions of traffic it could certainly be
the case that the Amazon Echo Dot oﬄoads some work to the Amazon Echo Show
who then relays it back to the Echo Dot over the LAN. As a result we shall consider
these two devices separate but somewhat coupled.
39
Chapter 6
RESULTS
I present the results of this work as a series of 4 experiments. The experiments follow
the methodology proposed in the previous section, starting a baseline of classification
and progressing to filter design, false positive reduction, and the introduction of
background traffic.
6.1 Models
In this section I will establish the parameters used for each of the classifiers referenced
in this chapter. Although some effort was put into fine tuning the machine learning
algorithms used in this work, optimizing the performance of the individual classifiers
is beyond the scope of this work.
In this work I utilized the Matlab implementation of a Random Forest, available
through the Classification Learner. Table 6.1 shows the properties of the Random
Forest classifier used.
I relied on the Matlab implementation of Neural Networks, available through the
Deep Learning Toolbox. Table 6.2 shows the parameters of the two-layer feed-forward
network.
Type of Learner Decision Tree
Number of Learners 30
Max number of splits 812,171
Split Criterion Gini Index
Table 6.1: Random Forest Parameters
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Number of Hidden Layers 1
Number of Hidden Neurons 20
Hidden Neuron Activation Function Sigmoid
Output Neuron Activation Function Softmax
Learning Rate 0.01
Performance Function Cross-Entropy
Table 6.2: Neural Network Parameters
K (Experimentally derived) 2770
Centroid Initialization Method k-means++
Maximum Iterations 300
Batch Size 100
Reassignment Ratio 0.01
Table 6.3: K-Means Parameters
For K-Means clustering I used the scikit-learn implementation of Mini-Batch
K-Means. Table 6.3 shows the parameters of the mode.
6.2 Baselines
In this section I establish the baseline classification accuracy of the trained models. The
purpose of this section is to demonstrate the levels of accuracy that were established
by the models without filtering in place or background traffic included.
A detailed description of how the features and models were selected, corresponding
confusion matrices as well as further information on the models trained only on certain
protocols and services are available in the Appendices.
Table 6.4 shows the baseline performance of the Random Forest.
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Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 98.50% 90.09% 90.36% 9.91%
Echo Show 98.42% 93.90% 84.19% 6.10%
Eufy Genie 99.68% 96.39% 99.36% 3.61%
Google Home 98.51% 96.12% 94.13% 3.88%
Table 6.4: Baseline Performance of Random Forest classifier
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 99.83% 97.59% 96.33% 2.41%
Echo Show 99.88% 97.66% 98.41% 2.34%
Eufy Genie 99.98% 99.98% 99.96% 0.02%
Google Home 99.96% 99.79% 99.83% 0.21%
Table 6.5: Performance of model trained on HTTP(S)
Table 6.5 shows the baseline performance of the Random Forest when trained on
HTTP and HTTPS connections only.
6.3 Experiment 1: K-Means Clustering
In this section I present the results obtained by performing K-Means clustering. All
12 features were used including categorical attributes, such as protocol and service,
which needed to be transformed to numerical values.
The results achieved in this experiment filter confirmed the claim that devices
behavior tended to form either homogenous or heterogenous clusters. In Table 6.6 and
Table YY I present some of the larger clusters observed to demonstrate this pattern.
These results ultimately served as the rationale for the implementation of a filter
which is introduced in the next experiment.
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Figure 6.1: 5 Large Homogenous Clusters
Cluster Size Entropy Variation Service duration src. packets src. bytes resp. packets resp. bytes
1 127256 0.0005 0 http 7 5 337 5 933
2 65143 0 0 http 7 6 391 4 299
3 36034 0 0 http 7 5 337 5 636
4 10749 0 0.02 http 7.397 5 336.05 5 589.15
5 11128 0.104 0.17 other 1.949 2 120 0 0
Table 6.6: 5 Large Homogenous Clusters
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Figure 6.2: 5 Large Heterogenous Clusters
Number Size Entropy Variation Service duration src. packets src. bytes resp. packets resp. bytes
1 21962 1.393 0 unknown 7 1 60 0 0
2 8361 1.109 0 dns 0 1 75.99 1 76
3 4826 1.866 0.01 unknown 7 1 51.188 0 0
4 3743 1.72 0.15 unknown 1.582 2 111.85 1 59.7
5 2086 1.68 0.87 unknown 0.026 1 52 1 60
Table 6.7: 5 Large Heterogenous Clusters
Some key observations from homogenous clusters include:
• The Eufy Genie was the device most commonly found in homogenous clusters.
• Amazon devices were less likely to form highly homogenous clusters
• Homogenous clusters tended to contain HTTP and HTTPS traffic
• Homogenous clusters typically involved multi-packet exchanges
• Entropy is a sensitive measurement. Even a very small proportion of connections
from different devices will lead to significantly higher entropy than a pure cluster.
Some key observations from heterogeneous clusters include:
• Clusters were generally smaller in size
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• All four devices appeared in many of the clusters
• Clusters tended to contain DNS or traffic from unknown services
• Clusters typically involved short or single-packet exchanges
6.4 Experiment 2: Introducing the Filter
Given the results in Experiment 5, implementing the filter appeared to be a viable
method of reducing false positives. To derive an appropriate entropy threshold It was
necessary to examine the relationship between maximum allowed entropy and model
performance. I varied the entropy threshold from 0 to 1 measuring the effect on both
precision and recall. Results are only plotted for the lower half of entropy thresholds
(less than 1), and as filtering with larger entropy thresholds are not useful given the
goals of this work.
Figure 6.3 shows that as the entropy threshold approaches 0, the Echo Show and
Echo Dot have a significant portion of their traffic filtered out, meaning that their
connections tended to cluster heterogeneously. On the other hand, the Eufy Genie
only has a small amount of traffic filtered out indicating that its connections cluster
homogeneously. Therefore, the percentage of connections filtered out at low entropy
thresholds can be viewed as a measure of the uniqueness of device behavior.
In Figure 6.4, the amount of traffic remaining for each service is plotted as the
entropy threshold decreases. It can be seen that traffic from unknown services are
filtered out at a much faster rate while http and https traffic does not decrease
significantly.
At this point is important to note that moving forward performance is calculated
considering both the filtering and classification portions of the model. In other words,
filtered data is taken into account when calculating performance metrics. This means
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Figure 6.3: Connections Filtered
Figure 6.4: Traffic Remaining
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Figure 6.5: Precision and Recall vs. Threshold
that samples that are filtered count as False negatives for the corresponding class and
True negatives for all other classes despite neither being trained nor tested on. This
allows for a more complete measure of Recall and Accuracy.
Figure 6.5 shows the weighted averages of recall and precision average across the
four devices. It is clear that an inverse relationship is present as recall increases with
entropy threshold while precision decreases. This can be attributed to the filtering.
For low thresholds, more confusing samples are removed and the model is less likely to
make false positive predictions. However, the filter inevitably removes both positive
and negative samples from the dataset resulting in a higher number of false negatives.
As described in Section 5.1 this is acceptable given the much higher cost of false
positives.
It first appears that maximum precision is achieved at the lowest entropy threshold.
However, this is not true. At a certain entropy threshold the precision stop decreasing.
Any samples filtered out past this point only serve to decrease recall and overall model
robustness without any other benefit. To find this point, I examined the false discovery
rate for very low entropy thresholds.
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Figure 6.6: Precision and Recall vs. Threshold
Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home
Echo Dot 10,088 0 8 65
Actual Echo Show 2 10,214 10 44
Eufy Genie 1 3 290,737 3
Google Home 0 1 3 118,554
Table 6.8: Confusion Matrix of Model with Filter
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 83.53% 99.97% 12.47% 0.03%
Echo Show 73.00% 99.96% 8.09% 0.04%
Eufy Genie 74.81% 99.99% 72.87% 0.01%
Google Home 79.63% 99.91% 57.52% 0.09%
Table 6.9: Performance of model with Filter
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Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home
Echo Dot 6,459 0 0 11
Actual Echo Show 2 8,792 0 2
Eufy Genie 0 0 281,308 0
Google Home 0 1 0 107,968
Table 6.10: Confusion Matrix of Model with Filter on HTTP(S) Traffic
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 92.098% 99.969% 16.81% 0.031%
Echo Show 96.503% 99.989% 38.33% 0.011%
Eufy Genie 90.918% 100.000% 88.45% 0.000%
Google Home 95.579% 99.988% 85.79% 0.012%
Table 6.11: Performance of Model with Filter on HTTP(S) Traffic
Figure 6.6 shows that the false discovery rate stopped decreasing around an entropy
threshold of 0.02. Given this results, 0.02 was selected as the optimal entropy threshold
to be used in the remaining experiments.
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 provide a more complete picture of the performance of the
classifier, with input filtered at a threshold of 0.02. While both the Echo Dot and
Echo Show had many of their samples filtered out, the total error is significantly lower.
When applied to only HTTP and HTTPS traffic even higher precision is observed
(Table 6.11), and the high error between the Echo Dot and Echo Show is eliminated
(Table 6.10).
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6.5 Experiment 3: Introducing Background Traffic
In the final experiment background traffic from the CTU-13 dataset was introduced
to determine if device classification is feasible in a realistic scenario. First, I added
the Background traffic to the full set of capture device traffic which I will refer to as
the IVA dataset from here on out. I then passed this dataset through the filter with
an entropy threshold of 0.02, and retrained two models: one on the full set of data
and one on only HTTP and HTTPS traffic.
This new dataset is not representative of a realistic capture scenario due to the
mismatched time frames. The CTU-13 capture was taken over a period of several
days while the IVA dataset was created through at 15 week capture.
However, it is only necessary to worry about the time frames of the individual
connections and not the length capture itself. The classifier is not taking into account
more elaborate patterns that may emerge over many long periods of time because
patterns of behavior are limited to being described by a single connection log entry.
The remaining capture time only allows for multiple instances of behavior to be
captured.
With regards to the length of the connections themselves, mismatches in capture
lengths could cause there to be some connections in the IVA dataset that last longer
than the entire CTU-13 capture. In this case the classifier would be easily able
to predict that these connections are not Background traffic. It was consequently
necessary to ensure that the CTU-13 capture was long enough to contain connections
of similar duration to that of the IVA dataset. Otherwise, this dataset was not far
from what an ISP might observe.
50
Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home Background
Echo Dot 108,645 3,199 1,023 2,446 10,799
Echo Show 7,525 67,164 366 1,788 4,153
Actual Eufy Genie 276 397 376,364 617 2,137
Google Home 1,402 689 1,673 191,622 10,706
Background 50 55 26 157 2,524,894
Table 6.12: Confusion matrix of Model 1 with background traffic
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 99.196% 92.191% 86.15% 7.809%
Echo Show 99.452% 93.930% 82.92% 6.070%
Eufy Genie 99.804% 99.193% 99.10% 0.807%
Google Home 99.413% 97.453% 92.98% 2.547%
Background 99.154% 98.911% 99.99% 1.089%
Table 6.13: Performance of Model 1 with background traffic
6.5.1 Model 1
The first model was trained and tested was the original dataset of 812,172 connections
(no filter, all types of traffic) with 2,525,182 Background connections added from the
CTU-13 dataset. The introduction of Background Traffic, shown in Table 6.13, had
almost no effect on the classification performance of Devices. With the exception of
the Eufy Genie, Background traffic was classified with higher precision and recall than
most of the devices. It is interesting to observe that the model produced significantly
more false positives than false negatives when classifying Background Traffic.
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Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home Background
Echo Dot 22,077 690 22 92 55
Echo Show 473 37,730 21 100 92
Actual Eufy Genie 12 58 317,922 11 47
Google Home 60 125 21 125,609 36
Background 2 7 106 0 164,074
Table 6.14: Confusion matrix of Model 2 with background traffic
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 99.790% 97.591% 96.25% 2.409%
Echo Show 99.766% 97.721% 98.21% 2.279%
Eufy Genie 99.971% 99.980% 99.96% 0.020%
Google Home 99.934% 99.839% 99.81% 0.161%
Background 99.948% 99.860% 99.93% 0.140%
Table 6.15: Performance of Model 1 with background traffic
6.5.2 Model 2
I trained the next model on the subset of all HTTP and HTTPS traffic. Again,
performance did not vary significantly from prior results without background traffic.
Again, the Echo Dot and Echo Show suffer from a high false discovery rate. Background
traffic achieves high precision and recall, but only examining HTTP and HTTPS
traffic reduces the Background dataset size from 2,525,182 to 164,419.
6.5.3 Model 3
For the next model, the dataset used for the first model in the section was passed
through a the filter with an entropy threshold of 0.02. The filter included a much
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Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home Background
Echo Dot 2,771 16 0 7 53
Echo Show 4 1,288 3 1 55
Actual Eufy Genie 1 3 220,363 0 24
Google Home 7 2 0 85,867 71
Background 3 14 0 4 1,740,299
Table 6.16: Confusion matrix of Model 3 with background traffic
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 93.985% 99.569% 2.20% 0.431%
Echo Show 96.112% 97.354% 1.59% 2.646%
Eufy Genie 91.291% 99.999% 55.23% 0.001%
Google Home 94.137% 99.986% 41.66% 0.014%
Background 61.719% 99.988% 68.92% 0.012%
Table 6.17: Performance of Model 3 with background traffic
larger proportion of Background traffic, but excluded a large amount of the Echo Dot
and Echo Show traffic. It can be seen that recall and accuracy decrease significantly
due to the large proportion of samples filtered out. However, in the case of the Eufy
Genie and Google Home the false discovery rate is exceptionally low.
The relatively poor performance of the Echo Dot and Echo Show can be attributed
to the much lower number of samples that made it through the filter. It appears
that the introduction of Background traffic had an effect on cluster entropy for these
devices. It may be required that the optimal entropy threshold be redetermined for
each dataset in order to maximize precision.
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6.6 Experiment 4: Realistic Private Network Scenario
As an additional experiment. I attempted to use Model 3 of Experiment of 4 (Section
6.5.3) to classify connections made in a dataset meant to simulate a capture on a
realistic private network. The dataset was constructed by combining the following
captures.
• CTU-Normal-6: user working on a Linux desktop for several hours
• CTU-Normal-7: user working on a Linux desktop for several hours
• CTU-Normal-12: user working on a Linux notebook for several hours
• 6-hour capture of traffic from the IoT Testbed
None of the samples in this dataset were taken from the dataset used to train the
model. Therefore the model had previously neither seen the samples in this dataset
nor seen any samples belonging to the same capture as the samples in this dataset.
However, this experiment was not particularly conclusive. The 6 hour capture
produced a much smaller number of useful connections than expected, and even fewer
connections made through the filter. The confusion matrix in Table 6.18 shows that
the device traffic was almost entirely filtered out. As a result, the corresponding
performance metrics (Table 8) are not very meaningful. It appears that small captures
hinder the performance of the model. Longer captures are required so that behavior
patterns can be sufficiently observed.
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Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home Background
Echo Dot 0 0 0 0 0
Actual Echo Show 0 10 2 1 6
Eufy Genie 1 0 0 0 4
Google Home 0 0 0 0 0
Background 0 1 2 2 918
Table 6.18: Confusion matrix of Model 3 with background traffic
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 99.894% - - -
Echo Show 98.944% 90.909% 52.63% 9.091%
Eufy Genie 99.261% - - -
Google Home 99.683% - - -
Background 98.416% 98.922% 99.46% 1.078%
Table 6.19: Performance of Model 3 on private network scenario
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Chapter 7
DISCUSSION
The results listed above demonstrate that IVA-enabled smart speakers can be identified
with very high accuracy and precision using machine learning algorithms. Not only
can IVA-enabled smart speakers be differentiated from each other, they can be
differentiated reliably from background traffic. This implies that these results can be
extended to a variety of IoT devices which exhibit similarly unique behavior patterns.
Throughout this work it has been shown that despite the pervasiveness of encryption
does not prevent this attack which relies solely on packet metadata. This is problematic
given that the FCC overturned its decision to ban the restrictions placed on ISPs with
regards to data collection, claiming that encryption is sufficient.
The proposed methodology can be implemented with minimal modifications to
existing infrastructure. Further, given the very low false discovery rates implementation
at scale would not result in a problematic number of false positives. Therefore, ISPs
who are best positioned to collect training data for these models will also be best
positioned to then use the models to discover information about private networks.
This attack enable ISPs to consistently be able to determine which devices are
contained within the homes of their customers. Even further, once traffic can be
reliably associated with a particular device it is then possible to examine the traffic in
context of the particular device to perform activity inference. There is a selection of
literature which demonstrates the feasibility of such an attack [10, 36, 13, 11, 37]. For
example, it has been shown that Nest Thermostats can reveal at what times a person
is home, sleep monitors can reveal at which times a person sleeps, and smart kitchen
appliances can reveal information about the eating habits of an individual.
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This alone is a clear violation of privacy. However, the implications of this type of
attack extend far beyond trivial violations of privacy. When deployed at scale this type
of data collection generates valuable information about what devices consumers have
and how they interact with them. This presents a tremendous opportunity for ISPs
to collect information about the specific devices owned by each of their customers.
This information can be sold to businesses or be used to give preferential (or
discriminatory) treatment to traffic from certain devices. Therefore, it is important to
pose the question of whether ISPs, as an intermediary to communication, have a right
to profit from this type of data collection.
Next it is important to discuss the viability of defenses which can be implemented
to protect against such attacks. It has already been established that encryption alone
is not a suitable defense, so alternatives must be examined.
One possible defense includes the use of VPN Tunneling. VPN (Virtual Private
Network) Tunneling allows for an entire packet (including metadata) to be encrypted
and then encapsulated within a carrier packet for transport. The carrier packet can
then be transmitted to a proxy server who then can encrypt the carrier packet and
forward the original packet to its intended destination. With VPN tunneling in place all
traffic from a network will appear to originate from a single pair of endpoints. However,
it is unlikely that VPN tunneling is adopted as a defense because it is unreasonable
to assume that manufacturers will design their IoT devices to communicate in this
manner. Further, this approach is not perfect. First, VPN tunneling does not entirely
protect against this attack if the networks activity is sparse or if a dominating device
is present. Second, the use of a tunnel prohibits ISPs from performing this attack,
but consequently enables proxy servers to conduct it.
Another possible defense is traffic shaping. Traffic shaping involves modifying
traffic rates to fit some predetermined schedule and padding or fragmenting packets
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such that they are all the same size. This will consistently protect against the attack,
but comes with an inherent bandwidth and latency cost. Given this cost, companies
have been reluctant to adopt any form of it. However, if the bandwidth and latency
limitations can be overcome, traffic shaping seems the most viable defense to this
attack.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
This work has established that IVA-enabled smart speakers exhibit distinct commu-
nication patterns that classifiers can be trained to identify. Further, communication
patterns are so distinct that classifiers can still identify devices in the presence of a
large amount of background network traffic. The results suggest that classifiers can
be trained to identify connections made by IoT devices in general.
Traffic is logged given only features that an upstream observer has access to.
This type of data collection can occur at scale with minimal modification to existing
infrastructure allowing for this methodology to be implemented at scale. As scale
increases even moderately low rates of false positive can destroy classifier trust.
However, I have shown in this work that clustering can be used to reduce the false
positive rate to a rate that is manageable at scale.
This type of data collection has significant implications on privacy when imple-
mented by an upstream observer. ISPs, for example, can utilize these methods to
learn about what devices their customers have in their homes, to perform activity
inference, and to give preferential treatment to certain types of traffic. These are
legitimate concerns and warrant discussion regarding the implementation of defenses
and regulation to prevent this type of data collection.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
To get a sense of what types of information can be extracted by examining device
activity I conducted a preliminary traffic analysis.
Out of the 2,128,290 total connections in the dataset 1,344,133 were with another
device on the same LAN. This is certainly an interesting finding as it demonstrates
just how frequently smart home devices communicate to discover each other and
maintain consistency across different platforms. For example, the Amazon devices
on the network such as the Echo Show, two Echo Dots, and a Fire Stick frequently
attempt to discover each other and coordinate responses so that only a single device
responds to a request even when multiple can hear it. Similarly, Spotify enabled
devices communicate to allow music playback on remote devices and ensure that only
one account is listening at a time.
The remaining 834,157 connections consisted of upstream traffic intended for hosts
on external networks. To get an understanding of the identity of these hosts I examined
the set of DNS queries generated from the network. In Table A.1 I show the set of
the 20 most queried domains. This list alone reveals information about what devices
may exist on the network. Requests to domains are seen with the words “Alexa”,
“eufy-genie”, “amazon”, and “google”. Many of these seem to be associated with APIs
and cloud services. Other requests containing phrases such as “connectivity-check”,
and “device-metrics” seem to be relaying information about devices to the cloud. It
is also interesting to note that some of the most frequent DNS requests were DNS
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Figure A.1: HTTP Activity
requests to local domains (not shown) coming from devices or applications such as
Spotify and Chromecast presumably for discovery and other LAN interactions.
Next, I examined the type of HTTP requests that devics engaged in. Figure
A.1 shows the breakdown by type of request. However, the Amazon Echo and Dot
produced significantly less HTTP traffic (1,368 and 20,635 connections, respectively)
than the Google Home and Eufy Genie (81,814 and 321,632 connections, respectively).
It is important to note that there were no POST requests observed from the devices.
This could be in part due to the fact that devices were not being actively interacted
with, but probably due to encryption of POST requests in order to preserve privacy.
Additionally, the Google Home only engaged in HEAD requests. These requests only
reveal metadata about the document being requested and are useful for caching, but
do not necessarily reveal sensitive information in the response body.
Figure A.2 shows encrypted HTTPS connections. Given that the Eufy Genie
sent such a large number of unencrypted HTTP requests it is not surprising that it
hardly engaged in any HTTPS connections. The Amazon Echo Show and Google
Home’s connections are encrypted much more frequently as a they sent far fewer
unencrypted GET requests. Strangely, the Amazon Echo Dot does not engage in very
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DNS Query Number of Queries
www.google.com 65424
avs-alexa-na.amazon.com 56584
clients4.google.com 23786
clients1.google.com 13017
time.google.com 7855
api.amazonalexa.com 7432
time.windows.com 6683
spectrum.s3.amazonaws.com 5971
channel.status.request.url 4381
device-metrics-us.amazon.com 4019
arcus-uswest.amazon.com 3290
clients3.google.com 2430
ntp-g7g.amazon.com 1912
api.amazon.com 1795
android.googleapis.com 1633
kindle-time.amazon.com 1415
dp-gw-na.amazon.com 1283
genie.eufylife.com 1137
www.yahoo.com 911
connectivitycheck.gstatic.com 753
Table A.1: Common DNS Queries
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Figure A.2: HTTPS Activity
Device Domain Frequency
Google Home clients4.google.com 40680
Echo Dot device-metrics-us.amazon.com 6317
Echo Show api.amazonalexa.com 16222
Eufy Genie genie.eufylife.com 2397
Table A.2: Domains Contacted Most Frequently Using Encryption
many connections. One possible explanation is that the Echo Show relays information
to the Echo Dot locally, in order to reduce duplicate requests.
Bro provides a log of activity it identifies as weird. From the Bro documentation:
Weird activity is defined as unusual or exceptional activity that can
indicate malformed connections, traffic that does not conform to a par-
ticular protocol, malfunctioning, or misconfigured hardware, or even an
attacker attempting to avoid/confuse a sensor.
In Figure A.3 I list a breakdown of these observed behaviors by device.
It can be seen that premature and active connection reuse are seen occurring in all
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Figure A.3: Weird Behavior
devices. Data before connection establishment seems to occur much more frequently
in the Amazon devices, especially the Echo Show, while the DNS unmatched reply is
observed frequently in the Google Home.
This analysis showed that devices engaged in distinct behavior and even revealed
their presence through the domains that they contacted. While this analysis was
useful, manual examination of device behavior is not a viable option for classifying
devices. An alternative approach for device fingerprinting must be considered which
is both more flexible and scalable.
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Appendix B
MODEL SELECTION
In Section 5.2 I described the rationale behind choosing Random Forests as my primary
classifier. However, in this experiment I formally demonstrate that Random Forests
provide the best performance. The input dataset for this experiment is the set of all
upstream connection labeled by Device, with all twelve features included.
B.1 Feedforward Neural Network (MLP)
Table B.1 and Table B.2 illustrate the performance of the MLP classifier
B.2 Random Forests
Table B.3 and Table B.4 illustrate the performance of the Random Forest classifier
The results listed in Tables B.3 and B.4 show that the Random Forest was better
suited for this classification problem than the Neural Network (Table B.1 and B.2). In
section 5.2, I have outlined some potential causes of this disparity in performance. I
Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home
Echo Dot 76,733 11880 11727 8538
Actual Echo Show 10314 46,302 4352 3506
Eufy Genie 27412 11441 361,846 26645
Google Home 11,653 11,374 21046 167,403
Table B.1: Confusion matrix of MLP classifier
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Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 89.962% 60.845% 70.48% 39.155%
Echo Show 93.491% 57.165% 71.81% 42.835%
Eufy Genie 87.364% 90.695% 84.67% 9.305%
Google Home 89.810% 81.227% 79.16% 18.773%
Table B.2: Performance of MLP classifier
Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home
Echo Dot 113,959 3,295 5,015 3,843
Actual Echo Show 8,364 68,192 1,986 2,455
Eufy Genie 621 411 396,405 1,534
Google Home 3,547 721 7,824 194,000
Table B.3: Confusion matrix of Random Forest classifier
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 98.50% 90.09% 90.36% 9.91%
Echo Show 98.42% 93.90% 84.19% 6.10%
Eufy Genie 99.68% 96.39% 99.36% 3.61%
Google Home 98.51% 96.12% 94.13% 3.88%
Table B.4: Performance of Random Forest classifier
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experimented with hyperparameters such as the number of hidden neurons in my Neural
Network before settling on my final configuration. However, experimentation with
different Deep Learning architectures and meticulous fine tuning of hyper-parameters
is outside the scope of this work. It is entirely possible that a more specialized Deep
Learning model can outperform the Random Forests used in this work.
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Appendix C
FEATURE SELECTION
In this experiment a Random Forest is trained only on a single attribute and the
model’s accuracy is evaluated using 5-fold cross-validation. The input dataset for
this experiment is the set of all upstream connection labeled by Device (812,172
connections). The purposed of this experiment was to examine the importance of each
feature and try various combinations of features to determine the final feature set.
Figure C.1 shows the accuracy of the single-feature models. Every feature was
able to provide greater than 50% accuracy with the exception of originator port which
in the case of a NATed network is usually randomly generated by the NAT router
solely for purpose of maintaining internal mappings. The most interesting takeaway
is that the bytes sent and received, both at the application and network layer, were
the best predictors of device. Next, history provided good accuracy as well which is
unsurprising as the state history of a connection can convey a significant amount of
information about the type of behavior a device engages in.
With a basic understanding of the importance of each feature, the next step was to
determine which features in combination lead to increased accuracy and which made
little or no difference. I again trained Random Forests in combination with 5-fold
cross-validation.
Starting with the best performing features I incrementally increased the size of
the feature set such that accuracy increased. In most cases this was done by including
the next best performing feature which was already not in the feature set. However,
this was not the case for all of the feature sets. In the smaller feature sets I chose
to exclude the network layer bytes (orig/resp ip bytes) to reduce redundancy since
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Figure C.1: Accuracy of models trained on individual features
application layer bytes were already included. Similarly, port numbers were excluded
due to the protocol and service features.
Further, I chose not to include history and connection state for feature sets 2, 4, 7,
and 9. These features are not universal to all flow level records and excluding them
allowed me to show the effectiveness of the attack when using only commonly available
features of network traffic. Next, my focus shifted to maximizing accuracy.
Key takeaways from this portion of results include the following:
• 91.3% accuracy can be achieved only relying on the number of bytes sent and
received
• Bytes sent/received, number of packets, and history have the biggest impact on
accuracy.
• Increasing the number of features increases accuracy.
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Feature set: 2 4 5 7 9 11 12
conn state
duration
history
missed bytes
orig bytes
orig ip bytes
orig pkts
proto
resp bytes
resp ip bytes
resp pkts
service
Table C.1: Features in each Feature Set
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• Increasing the size of the feature set from 5 to 12 only leads to a 0.7% increase
in accuracy.
I ultimately chose the feature set of size 12 in an effort to achieve the best possible
accuracy. However, it is important to note that fairly high accuracy was still possible
with smaller feature sets. This finding shows that the attack is still possible despite
more limited network analysis capabilities.
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Appendix D
CLASSIFIER ACCURACY BY PROTOCOL AND SERVICE
The following experiment examines classifier accuracy on traffic separated by protocol
and service. The purpose of this experiment is to better understand which types of
traffic include unique patterns of behavior that can be used to identify a device. First I
seperated device traffic by protocol. Figure D.1 shows amount and type of traffic sent
by each device. The distribution of traffic across the various services and protocols
has implications for the models trained in this section. Because all devices do not
equally rely on the same services or protocols, filtering by service introduces a bias in
the training set. For example, training on only http traffic results in a dataset that
does not include very many connections from the Echo Show or Echo Dot. Therefore,
this information can help to determine which results in this section are meaningful,
and which may be problematic.
Figure D.2 shows a case of misleading results as upon initial observation it appears
that the model trained on UDP traffic achieves the best accuracy. However, by
examining the distribution of traffic by protocol in Figure D.1 it becomes clear that
the only devices sending a significant amount of UDP traffic are the Google Home and
the Echo Dot, and that UDP traffic in general is far rarer than TCP traffic. The fact
that the model achieved 99.6% accuracy is still notable. Upon further examination I
was able to discover that while the majority of udp traffic is DNS requests, the Google
Home had 10,246 non-DNS connections, suggesting that the Google Home relies on
UDP in ways that other devices do not.
Examining traffic separated by service (Figure D.4), it is clear that models trained
on HTTP and HTTPS produce the best performance. Traffic from unknown services
simply does not provide a comparable level of accuracy, presumably due to the high
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Figure D.1: Device Traffic
Figure D.2: Accuracy
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Figure D.3: Device Traffic
Figure D.4: Accuracy
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Predicted
Echo Dot Echo Show Eufy Genie Google Home
Echo Dot 22,094 692 25 125
Actual Echo Show 482 37,807 24 103
Eufy Genie 13 65 317,933 39
Google Home 51 148 18 125,634
Table D.1: Confusion Matrix of model trained on HTTP(S)
Device Accuracy Precision Recall False Discovery
Echo Dot 99.83% 97.59% 96.33% 2.41%
Echo Show 99.88% 97.66% 98.41% 2.34%
Eufy Genie 99.98% 99.98% 99.96% 0.02%
Google Home 99.96% 99.79% 99.83% 0.21%
Table D.2: Performance of model trained on HTTP(S)
variance across the types of connections which fall into this category. The HTTP
results are problematic due to the lack of connections by the Echo Dot and Echo
Show (Figure D.3) while the HTTPS results lack connections from the Eufy Genie.
However, all four devices are represented in the combined set of both HTTP and
HTTPS traffic. The model trained on this set achieves 98.4% accuracy. Many IoT
devices rely on HTTP or HTTPS to send REST API calls to Cloud Services. These
findings demonstrate that analyzing interactions with these Cloud Services alone is
enough to identify devices.
Table D.1 shows the confusion matrix of the model trained on HTTP and HTTPS
traffic. It is interesting to note that the greatest error was observed between the two
Amazon devices, the Echo Dot and the Echo Show, who likely share many of the same
Cloud Services.
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Table D.2 shows the model performance. This is a clear improvement over the
model trained on the entire dataset. However, classification between Echo Dot and
the Echo Show still are not comparable with the Eufy Genie and Google Home. This
is likely due to similarity between connections which the filter introduced in the next
experiment will seek to eliminate.
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